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ABSTRACT 
This study tests two major prescriptions of Staw and Ross about the management of escalation 
behavior in organizations. Since these prescriptions are primarily based on research using students in 
controlled settings, the efficacy of the prescriptions was tested in the context of a real, functioning 
organization. The results provide conditional support for separating initial decision responsibility from 
subsequent responsibility as a means of reducing escalation behavior. However, the findings did not 
support a reduction of project failure risk as a means of minimizing escalation of commitment to a 
failing course of action. 
Subject Areas: Decision Processes and Organizational Behavior. 
INTRODUCTION 
Escalation of commitment is defined as a decision maker's continued commit­
ment to a specific course of action despite information that suggests the course 
of action is failing. Beginning with Staw's seminal article [14], the phenomenon 
has attracted a great deal of attention [I] [2] [3] [14] [15] [16] [17] because decision 
makers who escalate are presumed to be adopting an economically irrational course. 
Decision makers have been shown to invest more money and assume greater risks 
in a chosen course of action despite the presence of evidence indicating that con­
tinued commitment to that course is unwise. 
The reason why decision makers escalate has to do with the psychological mech­
anism of commitment [Il]. Commitment is defined as an individual's adoption 
of a stance of belief in the appropriateness of a course of action. This stance of 
belief may be subject to the decision maker's motivation to self-justify [6], to justify 
him/herself to others [5], and/or to be behaviorally consistent [18]. Thus, econom­
ically irrational behavior is continued because the decision maker believes that the 
social/psychological benefits of continuing in terms of self-image, reputation, face 
saving, and role performance outweigh the costs. Note that commitment here refers 
to persistence in any failing course of action and so it is a more generalized notion 
than, for example, job commitment. However, escalation can develop in a job 
commitment decision [9] [12]. 
Nonetheless, Staw and Ross [17] recognized the clear and important impli­
cations that escalation of commitment has for decision making in organizations. 
*The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers whose comments on earlier 
drafts led to substantial improvements in this manuscript. 
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As a result of extant research, they prescribed actions to reduce or eliminate deci­
sion makers' tendency to escalate. This paper describes a test of two of Staw and 
Ross's prescriptions and discusses the implications for managing escalation behavior 
in organizations. 
Staw and Ross proposed to reduce escalation first by removing a sense of 
responsibility from decision makers. This recommendation was based on research 
that indicated only those responsible for an initial course of action were likely to 
escalate [1] [2] [3] [4] [14] [15] [16] [17]. Thus, Staw and Ross [17] recommended 
(1) periodic replacement of original decision makers in the middle of a project 
with different administrators who were not responsible for the original commit­
ment or (2) use of separate decision makers for initial and subsequent decisions 
on a project. Certainly both methods are potentially disruptive but disruption might 
be preferable to escalation. 
The second recommendation is based on the belief that decision makers tend 
to remain committed to a course of action when the perceived cost of failure is high 
[1] [10] and refers to the guaranteed failure of the project due to withdrawal. For 
example, if the decision maker perceives that failure on a project may adversely 
affect his/her career with the firm, he/she may feel forced to continue a losing 
course of action because the action's eventual (hoped for) success may be perceived 
as the only viable option. To counteract this tendency, Staw and Ross suggested that 
management should reduce the perceived risk of guaranteed project failure due 
to withdrawal [17]. Specifically, they recommended rationalizing failed decisions· 
to lessen the perceived impact on the decision maker. Rationalization in this case 
means telling the decision maker that the initial decision was a good one at the time 
even if it has turned out badly. As Staw and Ross pointed out, the organization 
must distinguish between the competent manager who has erred and the incompe­
tent manager. For the generally competent manager, rationalizing the error means 
giving feedback to the decision maker to reduce the perceived risk associated with 
project failure. This suggestion is consistent with results from numerous studies 
that indicate the form of feedback is important for successful performance [7]. 
The last prescription is based on the belief that negative information about 
the status of a project is filtered as it progresses up the organizational hierarchy. As 
Staw and Ross suggested, "no one wants to be the conveyor of bad news ... [and] 
those intimately involved with a project are not likely to distribute unflattering 
and less-than-optimistic forecasts" [17, p. 73]. Yet they pointed out that studies 
have shown a tendency not to escalate if decision makers are made aware of the 
true costs. Accordingly, Staw and Ross recommended enacting systems to reward 
honest reporting as much as successful outcomes to assure accurate data are used 
when evaluating project status. 
Because of the potential influence of these prescriptions on managers who wish 
to manage escalation behavior in their organizations, it is important to test these 
recommendations to assess their efficacy. Further, because these recommendations 
are based primarily on laboratory studies using student subjects [3] [17], empirical 
validation of the prescriptions on a sample of practicing managers is particularly 
important. 
Consequently, the objective of this study is to evaluate empirically the first 
two of these prescriptions using a sample of experienced managers. Note that the 
third prescription is not tested in this study, as it involves influencing the actions 
of the entire information system of an organization as opposed to the actions of 
an individual decision maker. This point is discussed further in the following section. 
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THE STUDY APPROACH 
In order to achieve the research objective, the present study establishes a context 
in which an initial decision is failing and the decision maker must decide whether 
or not to continue that course of action. The research leading to the first prescrip­
tion of Staw and Ross [17] discussed above indicates that responsibility for the 
initial decision is an important factor. Decision makers who are responsible for 
initiating a course of action tend to stay committed to that course of action [1] [2] 
[4] [14] [15] [17], although this is not inevitable [3] [10] [6]. 
Accordingly, responsibility for the initial decision is included as a factor in 
this study (see the next section for a description of the specific manipulation). Note 
that this study uses the specific approach of replacing decision makers in mid­
project to achieve the decoupling of initial and subsequent decision responsibility. 
However, the basic issue is whether the decision maker is or is not responsible for 
the initial decision, regardless of the approach used as the basis for experimental 
manipulation. 
In addition to initial responsibility, the present study also manipulates the 
context within which the decision to escalate or withdraw is made by altering the 
evaluative feedback provided to participants. The intent of this manipulation is 
to vary the risk of project failure perceived by the decision maker in escalating 
commitment (as recommended by Staw and Ross [17] in their second prescription). 
While the specific feedback manipulation is described later, it is important 
to explain the basis for the particular approach used to operationalize the feed­
back and the evaluative context it is intended to create. Staw and Ross suggested 
that the organization must lessen a project's "risk of failure" to reduce escalation 
behavior. As Hedberg and Jonsson [6] pointed out, risk involves uncertainty (Le., 
probability of various outcomes) times the stakes (Le., what may be gained or lost) 
associated with the possible outcomes. Staw and Ross specifically suggested a mod­
ification of the decision maker's perception of the personal stakes associated with 
a failed project. As Staw and Ross implied, if the manager feels his/her competence 
is in question as a result of negative feedback, he/she may see no other recourse 
but to try to make the situation successful by continuing to commit resources. 
Modification of the perception of risk in a decision situation essentially involves 
modifying the context or frame in which the decision is presented. Kahneman and 
1\rersky [8] proposed that inconsistencies in risk preference could result from 
different formulations of the risk involved. That is, the way a decision is worded 
or presented influences the evaluation of alternatives and thereby affects choice. 
Brockner and Rubin [3] pointed out that decision makers in a failing course 
of action are faced with the prospect of accepting a sure loss (by not investing 
further) or trying to recoup the investment (by allocating more resources). Consistent 
with the predictions of Staw and Ross, this prospect theory predicts decision makers 
will choose the latter, more risky option and thus escalate. Brockner and Rubin 
further pointed out that this choice behavior contradicts reinforcement theory 
predictions which suggest that feedback framed positively (or less negatively) leads 
to further commitment (escalation). . 
Therefore, to achieve variation of this framing effect when conditions deter­
iorate, the situation is rationalized using one of two types of feedback. With posi­
tive feedback, the initial decision is reasonable under the circumstances (which 
implies that the initial decision does not represent poor judgment on the part of 
the decision maker). With negative feedback, the initial decision is fundamentally 
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flawed (which implies poor judgment on the part of the decision maker). The manip­
ulation is intended to vary the perceived personal stakes of failure by using different 
frames of evaluative feedback. The manipulation is checked by asking subjects their 
perception of risk associated with additional funding. Since the uncertainty (prob­
ability) of project failure and the monetary stakes (i.e., specific dollar loss/gain) 
are held constant in the experiment, any systematic difference in perceived project 
risk represents the difference in personal stakes as perceived by the subject and 
thereby demonstrates a framing effect. 
The last prescription (i.e., assuring that the actual progress of the project! 
decision is represented in the information available for subsequent decision making) 
is addressed by the use of specific, fact-based scenarios that give the decision maker 
accurate information about the situation. The assumption used here is that accurate 
information must always be superior to biased or erroneous information for deci­
sion making. Staw and Ross's prescription was designed to assure the availability 
of accurate information to the decision maker. Since this study involves only the 
decision maker and not his/her informational system, it is not possible to include 
a factor to test a reward system to assure accurate information is available. This 
factor is therefore held constant in the experiment. 
Although Staw and Ross [17] did not specifically address the relationship 
among responsibility, evaluative context, and accurate information factors, their 
prescriptions imply an additive relationship. In other words, for optimal reduc­
tion of escalation behavior in an organization, all basic prescriptions can be used 
simultaneously (i.e., decoupling initial and subsequent responsibility, rationalizing 
poor results from initial decisions, and assuring accurate information for decision 
making). 
Thus, based on the prescriptions of Staw and Ross [17], the following are 
expected to be valid. 
1.	 Those not responsible for an initial decision are less likely to stay committed 
to a failing course of action than those responsible for the initial deci­
sion, regardless of the evaluative feedback framing. 
2.	 Those subjects who receive rationalizations (positively framed feedback) 
of poor initial results for a failing project are less likely to stay committed 
to a failing course of action than those who receive negative feedback, 
regardless of their responsibility for the initial decision. 
The expected relationships are graphically portrayed in Figure 1. Because 
information accuracy is held constant in this experiment, it is not included in the 
hypotheses or in the figure. 
METHOD 
A total of 123 employees with managerial experience in a high technology, 
international engineering firm participated in the experiment. Subjects on average 
were 34.1 years of age, employed by the company for 5.3 years, have held their 
present job 3.7 years, and supervised 2.7 subordinates. Sixty subjects held a 
bachelor's degree, 56 held a master's degree, and 7 held a Ph.D. degree. Subjects 
represented both administrative (i.e., corporate and financial staff) and technical 
personnel (e.g., sales, engineering), although technical personnel represented about 
70 percent of the sample. Both males (n =106) and females (n =13) were included 
in the sample (gender data were not available for four subjects). Subjects represented 
different nationalities including Japanese, English, German, French, Italian, and 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized relationship of responsibility for initial resource alloca­
tion and evaluative context based on prescriptions of Staw and Ross [17]. 
Escalation 
of 
Comm I tment 
Responsible 
Not Responsible 
Negative Positive 
Evaluative Context 
Swedish, although most of the subjects (70 percent of the sample) were citizens 
of the United States. In addition, 65 percent of the sample worked in the United 
States, while 35 percent worked overseas. 
Although subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions listed 
below, there was some concern that an unintended language/cultural bias could 
confound results. The responses of nonnative Americans to all the variables 
described below were tested against the responses of Americans. No differences 
were found so the multinational sample was used intact. 
Procedure 
Subjects read an investment scenario (a situation depicting events that might 
reasonably occur in their organization), made several decisions, and then responded 
to questions about their behavior and attitudes. 
In order to make the investment scenario as realistic as possible, it was designed 
with the help of the firm's management and incorporated a typical investment 
situation faced by employees of the firm. In addition, language and procedures 
idiosyncratic to the firm were incorporated to insure subject familiarity with, as 
well as interest in, the decision situation described. 
Subjects were instructed to assume the role of general manager of an actual 
division in the firm. They were also told that the firm typically allocated approx­
imately 10 percent of expected sales for expenses associated with securing those 
sales. Six months ago a client was targeted and $100,000 was authorized for demon­
strations and support personnel costs because a sale of $1 million was anticipated. 
To date, some $60,000 of the allocation has been spent but it appears the sale will 
go to a competitor. 
Manipulations 
Responsibility manipulation. Half the subjects were told that they had made 
the initial authorization for allocation of expenses ("responsible" condition) and 
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half the subjects were told that their predecessor had made the initial authoriza­
tion ("not responsible" condition). Note that subjects did not actually make the 
initial authorization but were told to assume that they had done so. Bazerman, 
Giuliano, and Appelman [2] successfully manipulated responsibility for a previous 
decision using a similar approach. 
Context manipulation. The framing of context manipulation was intended to 
affect the decision maker's attitude regarding the risk of failure of the project. 
Based on the prescription of Staw and Ross [17], half the subjects received a posi­
tively framed context in which they were told that even though the client was likely 
to buy from a competitor, they (or their predecessor in the "not responsible" condi­
tion) had exercised good judgment and only spent $60,000. There was, however, 
a possibility that the sale could still be made. Half the subjects received a neg­
atively framed context in which they were told that the client was likely to buy from 
a competitor, that this could be viewed as a disaster, and that they (or their pred­
ecessor in the "not responsible" condition) had exercised poor judgment for losing 
$60,000. There was, however, a possibility that the sale could still be made. 
The manipulations created a 2 X 2 design in which two levels of responsibility 
(responsible and not responsible for initial authorization) are crossed with two levels 
of context (feedback) framing (positive and negative). Subjects were randomly 
assigned to the experimental conditions to control for systematic differences in the 
groups that might influence their escalation behavior. Cell sizes ranged from 28 
to 31. 
Dependent Measures 
Two dependent measures were employed in the experiment. In the first, subjects 
could select one of two decision options: (I) invest no further or (2) risk the 
remaining $40,000 with the knowledge that there was a 20 percent chance of success 
and an 80 percent chance of losing the entire $100,000. These options were worded 
consistently with the subject's context frame condition. Thus, in the positive context 
frame subjects were presented with the following: 
Please indicate your decision below by circling the desired response. You should 
use your own judgment and experience. 
\.	 Save the remaining $40,000 by not continuing to invest in this firm. 
2.	 Risk the remaining $40,000 with a 20 percent chance of earning the entire 
$100,000 back from the proceeds of the sale and an 80 percent chance of 
gaining nothing from the original $100,000. 
Negative context frame subjects were presented with the following: 
Please indicate your decision below by circling the desired response. You should 
use your own judgment and experience. 
\. Accept a loss of $60,000 by not continuing to invest in this firm. 
2.	 Risk the remaining $40,000 with an 80 percent chance of losing the entire 
$100,000 and a 20 percent chance of losing $0 (i.e., break even from the 
proceeds of the sale). 
It is important to note that the wording for these choices is based on scenarios 
reported by Brockner and Rubin [3]. Because the scenarios depict a losing course 
of action, it is problematic to provide "positive" feedback. As a result, "positive" 
feedback is actually "less negative" than "negative" feedback. As Brockner and 
Rubin [3] noted, this kind of wording is consistent with the framing effects posited 
by the prospect theory and by Staw and Ross [17]. 
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It is also important to note that subjects in both context conditions were 
presented with mathematically equivalent choices. Further, these decision options 
were constructed so that the expected value of the loss from the gamble was con­
siderably more than the value of the certain loss. For example, in this study the 
expected value of the continued investment option is -$80,000 (Le., (.2)($0.0)+ 
(.8)(-$100,000», while the value of the withdrawal option is a certain -$60,000. 
This was done to assure that the decision for continued commitment (or escalation) 
was clearly riskier than the decision to withdraw. Thus, a decision to commit addi­
tional resources under these circumstances would represent irrational (risk-seeking) 
behavior consistent with the concept of escalation of commitment to a failing course 
of action. 
A second dependent measure was employed that required subjects to specify the 
probability of regaining the initial investment, which would induce her/him to 
continue to invest (Le., take the gamble). As noted above, the language used to por­
tray the second dependent variable was consistent with the subject's context frame. 
If the chance of Company XXX gaining (losing) the sale after expenditure of the 
additional $40,000 was 99 out of 100, you would probably recommend (not) 
spending the additional funds. Conversely, if the chance of gaining (losing) the 
sale was only 1 in 100 you would probably not ("not" deleted in negative context) 
recommend spending the extra money. As XXX's chance of gaining (losing) the 
sale was increased (decreased) from 1 percent (99 percent) there would be a point 
at which you would recommend spending the additional sales resources. In other 
words, what is the lowest (highest) chance of XXX gaining (losing) the sale that 
would prompt you to spend the additional resources? 
___ percent 
Or, check one of the following: 
(a)	 Would not recommend spending the added resources, no matter what the 
chance of gain (loss). 
(b)	 Would recommend spending the added resources, no matter what the chance 
of gain (loss). 
Because this dependent variable allowed subjects to select a specific level of 
uncertainty necessary for their continued commitment rather than a given level (as 
with the previous dependent measure), the magnitude of the subject's risk-taking 
behavior could be assessed. Further, as a follow-up measure it provided a consis­
tency check on the first dependent measure. 
After making the decisions, subjects completed several questions containing 
Likert-type rating scales to assess the effects of the responsibility and context 
framing. In addition, subjects indicated how important they thought the decision 
was (1 = not very important, 5= very important) and whether they thought respon­
sibility for the success of the account was out of their control (= 1) or in their hands 
(=7). 
RESULTS 
The responsibility manipulation was checked by asking subjects how responsible 
they felt for the initial authorization. They indicated their degree of responsibility 
on a five-point scale (1=not very responsible, 5=very responsible). The mean 
response of those in the' 'responsible" condition was 4.4 (standard deviation =.76), 
while the mean response of those in the "not responsible" condition was 2.2 (stan­
dard deviation = 1.28). These means are significantly different (F= 124.82, p < .001). 
The 2 x 2 design allows comparison of those subjects' feelings of responsibility 
who had different evaluative contexts as well as those with different responsibility 
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manipulations. Therefore, the data were checked for both interactive and main 
effects of context. Neither the main effect of context nor the interaction of respon­
sibility and context were significant. This suggests that context (feedback) does not 
affect the subjects' feelings of responsibility. Thus, as intended, those in the 
"responsible" condition reported feeling responsible for the initial authorization, 
while those in the "not responsible" condition reported otherwise. 
The context (feedback) manipulation was checked by asking the subjects two 
questions. First they were asked to indicate the level of risk they felt was assoc­
iated with investing additional funding. As discussed above, this question was 
intended to assess differences in perceived personal stakes associated with addi­
tional funding. They indicated the degree of risk they perceived on a five-point 
scale (l =no risk, 5 =too risky). 
Analysis of these data reveals a significant overall effect (F=7.54, p<.OOI, 
R2 = .16), a significant main effect for context (F= 18.10, p < .001), and a signif­
icant responsibility times context interaction (F=4.48, p < .05). The form of this 
interaction is shown in Figure 2. A simple effects test within levels of responsibility 
revealed significant differences of context within the "responsible" condition 
(F=21.39, p < .001) but not within the "not responsible" condition. Responsible 
subjects in the negative context reported they perceived more risk associated with 
further allocation than did subjects in the positive context. This result suggests that 
the prescription for reducing risk recommended by Staw and Ross [17] has the 
desired effect on those decision makers responsible for an initial commitment of 
resources but no effect on the risk perceptions of persons new to the project or 
initially not responsible. This outcome is important to the interpretation of the 
results presented below. 
In addition to the perception of risk, context was checked by asking subjects 
how disappointed they were in their present condition. Because the initial decision 
was producing negative results, all subjects were expected to be disappointed to 
some extent. Subjects in the positive context (i.e., the decision did not work out 
Figure 2: Interaction of responsibility and information content when level of 
perceived risk of project continuation is used as dependent variable (cell means 
are in parentheses). 
5 
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but judgment was good) were expected to be less disappointed with the present 
condition than those in the negative context (i.e., the initial decision could be viewed 
as a disaster). The subjects indicated their degree of disappointment on a five­
point scale (1 =not too disappointed, 5 = very disappointed). The mean response 
of those in the positive context was 3.6 (standard deviation = .94), while the mean 
response of those in the negative context was 4.1 (standard deviation = 1.02). These 
means are significantly different (F= 10.56, P < .01). There is no main effect for 
responsibility nor a significant interaction. This result suggests that subjects in the 
negative context manipulation were more disappointed in the initial outcome of 
the decision, regardless of responsibility for the initial decision. 
In addition to the manipulation check questions noted above, subjects were 
also asked two follow-up questions. First they were asked how important they 
thought the decision in the scenario was (1 =not very important, 5= very impor­
tant) and then were asked whether they thought the responsibility (now) for the 
success of the account they were handling was out of their control (= 1) or in their 
own hands (= 7). Variance in the responses to these questions was not significantly 
different due to responsibility and context factors. For the question about degree 
of importance, the mean response of all subjects was 4.14 (standard deviation = .75). 
For the question of degree of control, the mean response of all subjects was 5.13 
(standard deviation = 1.26). Thus, subjects reported that the decision was impor­
tant and responsibility for success was in their own hands, not out of their control. 
This is additional confirmation that the subjects took the exercise seriously. 
OVERALL ANALYSIS 
The first dependent variable required subjects to indicate whether they would 
withdraw from the project or continue to invest. Table 1 reports the result of chi­
square tests to determine whether the frequency of these choices differed among 
the four treatment groups. The results suggest a significant difference among cells 
in the "responsible condition (X:'=8.06, df=3, p<.05) but not in the "not respons­
ible" condition. A review of Thble 1 suggests that subjects in the "responsible­
positive" context cell appear to be most willing to escalate, while subjects in the 
"responsible-negative" context cell appear least willing to escalate. 
Thble 2 reports the mean probabilities of regaining the initial investment that 
would induce subjects to continue to invest. Note that for subjects in the negative 
Table 1: Observed frequencies of subject choices in each experimental condition. 
Negative Content Positive Content 
H. Responsible condition 
Number choosing to: 
Withdraw 20 10 
Continue to invest 9 21 
Note: x2 =8.06, df=3, p<.05. 
b. Not responsible condition 
Number choosing to: 
Withdraw 15 17 
Continue to invest 15 II 
Note: ~=.70, df=3, p is not significant. 
Note: Five subjects did not provide responses. 
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Table 2: Mean probability of regaining initial investment and thus inducing subjects 
to continue to invest. 
Responsibility 
Responsible 
Positive 
29.1 
(22.4) 
Information Content 
Negative 
48.6 
(21.2) 
Marginal Means 
38.9 
Not responsible 40.9 
(22.7) 
39.6 
(21.9) 
40.3 
Marginal means 35 44.1 
Note: A lower number indicates a lower probability of success and is therefore indicative of risk 
seeking (i.e., inclination to escalate). Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
context the appropriate probability is 1 minus the probability percentage they 
recorded in their response to the second dependent measure. Conversely, for posi­
tive context subjects, the probability percentage used is the same as the probability 
they recorded. A lower number indicates a willingness to accept a smaller chance 
of success, which in this experiment indicates a stronger commitment to continue. 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA used to test these means reveals a significant overall relationship 
(F=3.46, p <.05, R2 =.09), a significant main effect for context (F=4.52, p<.05), 
and a significant interaction between responsibility and context (F= 5.88, P < .05). 
The form of this interaction is depicted in Figure 3. According to these data, the 
influence of a context effect depends on whether or not subjects were responsible 
for the initial authorization of funds. 
A simple effects test within responsibility levels revealed significant differ­
ences for context within the "responsible" condition (F= 10.39, P < .01) but not 
within the "not responsible" condition. Responsible condition subjects in the posi­
tive context require a lower probability of success in order to continue investing 
than do responsible subjects in the negative context (i.e., the positive context subjects 
are more willing to continue to invest or escalate). 
The pattern of the means shown in Thbles 1 and 2 for both dependent var­
iables indicates that subjects were consistent in their choices. In both cases subjects 
in the responsible-positive context cell were the most willing to continue invest­
ment, while subjects in the responsible-negative context were the least willing to 
continue. 
Although the focus of the analysis of the second dependent variable is on proba­
bility assessment, subjects could choose to either recommend or reject spending 
additional resources no matter what the chance of gain (loss). Note that choosing 
to reject such expense is essentially a choice for withdrawal, while choosing to recom­
mend it is a choice for further commitment. Eighteen subjects chose one of these 
options rather than make a probability assessment. The expected frequencies for 
the cells are not large enough to permit chi-square analysis; however, 14 subjects 
chose to continue no matter what, and 9 of these 14 were in the positive context 
condition. This pattern generally conforms to that shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this paper was to test two of Staw and Ross's [17] prescrip­
tions for managing escalation of commitment behavior in a real organization setting. 
What was found sheds new and unexpected light on the effects of these prescrip­
tions. In brief, Staw and Ross's recommendations to decouple responsibility for 
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Figure 3: Interaction of responsibility and information content when probability 
of successfully regaining initial investment is used as dependent variable. 
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Note: Lower probability values indicate higher risk-taking behavior, that is, a stronger 
inclination to escalate. 
initial and subsequent decisions in a failing situation to reduce escalation behavior 
was supported, but only conditionally. The data in the present study reveal an inter­
active relationship between responsibility and context such that decision makers 
who were responsible for an initial decision and received feedback in a positive 
context were most inclined to escalate commitment, while those who were initially 
responsible and received negative feedback were least likely to escalate (see Figure 3). 
Staw and Ross also suggest that rationalization of a disappointing outcome 
will reduce the perception of the project's risk of failure, thus allowing the deci­
sion maker to make a more "rational" (nonescalative) decision. A review of Figure 
2 suggests that such a positive feedback context does indeed reduce perception of 
risk, but at least in this study it does so only for those decision makers responsible 
for the initial decision. More importantly, unlike the implied prediction of Staw 
and Ross, this reduction in risk perception resulted in more escalation, not less. 
One possible reason for these surprising results may be found by comparing 
Figures 2 and 3. It appears that the tendency to escalate is inversely related to the 
amount of risk perceived by the decision maker in continuing a commitment. Since 
the groups were randomly assigned a priori, it can be assumed that the risk propen­
sities of the individuals were roughly the same among groups. This suggests the 
amount of risk perceived by the subjects may be more important to escalation 
behavior than feelings of responsibility or disappointment. This seems to make 
sense from a strictly intuitive point of view. For example, if two people with the 
same risk propensity have different views of the "riskiness" of a gamble, it seems 
logical that the one who perceives less risk in the act will tend to gamble before 
the other. If indeed the underlying driving mechanism of the decision maker is 
perceived riskiness of continuing, these results are consistent with that explanation. 
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It is also possible that the use of real organizational decision makers confronted 
with a familiar, realistic scenario accounts for the results in the present study. Such 
subjects have more experience with decision making in the circumstances captured 
in this scenario than student subjects making more abstract decisions. Because our 
subjects were all from the same organization, there may have been an organiza­
tional culture bias affecting escalation behavior. Additional studies are necessary 
to examine these questions and to generalize results to other organizational settings. 
Managerial Implications 
Managing or influencing a situation that could lead to escalation behavior is 
certainly of interest to practicing managers. The data in the present study provide 
additional insight into Staw and Ross's [17] prescriptions for doing so. For example, 
Staw and Ross recommend either replacing managers in mid-project or having 
different managers make initial and later decisions. The idea behind this recom­
mendation is that only those responsible for the initial decision are likely to escalate. 
Our data, however, indicate that even those responsible for the initial decision will 
be disinclined to escalate if they receive negatively framed feedback about the 
project. 
Therefore, replacing managers or even having different managers make 
different decisions about the project not only disrupts managerial continuity but 
also may not be justified to prevent escalation, especially if the organization tends 
to place blame on the decision maker (negative evaluative context) and does not 
rationalize disappointing results (positive evaluative feedback). 
Staw and Ross [17] also suggested rationalizing the failing course of action in 
order to reduce the decision maker's perception of risk in the situation. However, 
the results of this study suggest that rationalization of bad outcomes does reduce 
the perception of risk but such rationalization tends to motivate the decision maker 
to persist instead of freeing him/her from a need to persist. Therefore, reducing 
the decision maker's perception of risk of project failure by whatever means does 
not appear to be desirable for reducing escalation behavior. 
In summary, to reduce the tendency for escalation in an actual organization 
setting, the results of this study suggest it is advantageous to retain the original 
decision makers while raising the perception of project risk by negatively framing 
disappointing intermediate outcomes. Additionally, if personnel are changed in 
mid-project, the nature of evaluative feedback appears to have virtually no effect 
on subsequent escalation behavior. [Received: October 23, 1987. Accepted: June 
21, 1988.] 
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